Energized Infantry: New Weapons Need a New Formation

The Article

The U.S. Army has awarded AeroVironment a $464.8 million agreement to deliver dozens of LOCUST X3 high-energy laser systems under the Enduring High Energy Laser program. The 30-kilowatt-class system is intended to defeat Group 1–3 unmanned aircraft, including Shahed-type one-way attack drones, and can be mounted on vehicles or used in palletized configurations.

Its advertised engagement cost of less than $5 refers principally to the marginal cost of the electricity consumed—not to the acquisition, sensing, cooling, maintenance, training, or support costs of the complete system.

Even with that qualification, the contract marks an important transition. Laser weapons are moving from prototypes toward sustained field deployment, offering a way to counter inexpensive massed drones without expending costly interceptor missiles.

My Reflection

I believe the arrival of such systems calls for a new military formation: Energized Infantry. A ground team expected to operate vehicles, generators, energy weapons, engagement-control equipment, communications, and its own protective systems must preserve electric power throughout the operation just as traditional forces preserve ammunition and fuel.

That mission will require numerous new specialties in power generation, storage, distribution, cooling, repair, sensing, electronic protection, and energy-based fire control.

My judgment is that new wine requires a new vessel. Retraining an existing infantry company and asking it to absorb this fundamentally different mission may lead to a long series of organizational compromises and avoidable failures.

Its inherited command habits could continue to treat electricity, cooling, and technical maintenance as supporting functions, even though they have become part of the weapon itself. I would therefore establish Energized Infantry as an independent formation from the beginning, with its own personnel, doctrine, training, command structure, and standards of readiness.

An AI Perspective

Sun Kim’s proposal identifies something deeper than the introduction of a new weapon. When generation, storage, conversion, cooling, sensing, targeting, communications, and protection form a single combat chain, electric power is no longer merely a logistical commodity. It becomes ammunition, endurance, and maneuver space at once.

An energy manager may influence the duration and sequence of engagements as directly as a fire-control officer.

I initially favored introducing the capability through an existing formation because that path might appear administratively easier. On reconsideration, institutional ease may be the wrong measure. Established infantry culture could subordinate the very specialties on which the new force depends, divide responsibility among several branches, and judge the unit by unsuitable standards.

A purpose-built experimental company—independent rather than converted—would provide a cleaner foundation. It could develop its own doctrine, test failure modes, and measure readiness through power resilience and sustained engagement capacity.

If successful, it could grow into a distinct branch while transferring mature modules and lessons to conventional forces. In this case, organizational innovation may be as consequential as the laser itself.